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TRANSNATIONAL TAKEOVER TALK-REGULATIONS
RELATING TO TENDER OFFERS AND INSIDER
TRADING IN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED
KINGDOM, GERMANY, AND AUSTRALIA
Roberta S. Karmel
I. INTRODUCTION
Cross border acquisitions, both friendly and hostile, are increasingly
international. Yet, the legal regimes governing acquisitions differ
significantly, even where the purposes of relevant statutes or regulations,
for example, the protection of investors, are compatible. Further,
securities laws frequently are given extraterritorial effect and therefore
regulatory disparities can lead to conflict and confusion.
This Article will focus on the control of information announcing a
public tender offer in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Australia. There are three critical aspects of such
control: the circumstances under which an announcement of a tender
offer must be made public, the type of information that a bidder must
disclose, and the suppression of such information by way of prohibitions
against trading on inside information. Some of the mechanical and
technical investor-protection regulations applicable to takeovers will also
be discussed.
Although the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have
developed from a common legal tradition, the way in which corporate
and securities law have become fixed in statutory standards is quite
different. The United States is a federal system in which corporate law
is governed by the states and securities law is governed by a federal
agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the federal
courts. Although the United Kingdom has a statutory corporation law
with some room for court development of cases on a director's fiduciary
duties, its regulatory system for tender offers is self-regulatory, and with
rare exception, is not enforced by the courts. However, as a Member
State of the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom is required to
implement by statute relevant EU directives relating to insider trading
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and tender offers. Germany, by contrast, although also a Member of
the EU, has a civil law tradition and a federal system. Yet, it has only
a voluntary and primitive regulatory regime for takeovers, despite an
insider trading law that prohibits trading on undisclosed information
about a takeover. Australia, although it has a strong federal system, has
a central government corporation and securities law, which includes
regulation of tender offers and insider trading.
In addition to legal differences, countries have quite different cultural
and economic approaches to capital formation. So called Anglo-Saxon
countries--the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have
equity-based systems of corporate finance where the shareholder is the
center of regulatory and legal protections. Accordingly, tender offer
regulation tends to be friendly to bidders and to encourage auctions for
corporate control. Germany, by contrast, has a creditor-based system
of corporate finance and a tradition of worker co-determination in
corporate governance, which tends to make its tender offer regulations
less hospitable to hostile bids.
Despite disparities in the securities laws relating to tender offers,
globalization and the trend toward equity-based corporate finance
systems are important forces for change in legal concepts and structures.
Transnational tender offers are becoming more common and they
inevitably lead to conflicts between differing regulatory regimes.
Traditional concepts of international law jurisdiction are not always
helpful in resolving such conflicts. Two of the ways in which conflicts
can be reconciled are mutual recognition and harmonization. Yet in the
tender offer arena, mutual recognition is a difficult policy choice because
it is unclear whether the relevant factor is the law applicable to the
governance of the bidder, the target corporation, or the law of the
country where shareholders of the corporation are located. If, as
increasingly is the case, a corporation's shareholders are located in
several countries, what law should protect them in a tender offer? This
Article will conclude that, in this area, international harmonization is an
appropriate means to reconcile differences in the law, but the near term
prospects for such harmonization are poor. Insofar as tender offer
regulation is concerned, the law of the country of the target's
incorporation should be respected to the extent this will foster investor
protection, but not if investors will be disadvantaged. Insofar as insider
trading violations are concerned, customary jurisdictional conflict of
interest principles probably is the best current solution.
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II. A COMPARISON OF TAKEOVER REGULATION

A. United States
In the United States, the capital markets are structured and regulated
to encourage capital formation by equity shareholders. Most large
corporations are publicly owned and federal law protects investors
primarily through mandated disclosure in capital raising and change of
control transactions, and the prohibition of fraud and manipulation in
the public securities markets.' Tender offers are regulated by the SEC
pursuant to the Williams Act,2 which amended the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) in 1968. Congress passed the Williams Act
because it was concerned that block purchases and large rapid
accumulations, which could result in changes in corporate control, were
taking place secretly. The Williams Act generally deals with the
disclosure obligations of bidders and was intended to equalize the
protection of investors in proxy contests and in takeover contests.4 The
Williams Act also gives investors equal or fair rights to participate in the
tender offer.
Any person who acquires a beneficial interest of five percent or more
of any class of equity security subject to the annual and periodic
reporting provisions of the Exchange Act (essentially, the common stock
of all publicly traded issuers) must file a statement of ownership with the
SEC within ten days after such acquisition.' This statement, made on
Schedule 13D, mandates disclosure about the person or group making
the five percent acquisition, its officers, directors, and principal business,
as well as any financing arrangements that have been entered into to
finance the purchase.6 Further, the filing must state the purchaser's
future intentions with regard to the target company; that is, whether the
purchaser intends to make a tender offer or engage in some other
control transaction.7 Any person planning to make a tender offer must
file a disclosure statement on Schedule 14D containing essentially this

1. SeeArthur R. Pinto, Corporate Takeovers Through the Publi Markets in the United States, 42 AM.J.
CoMP. L. 339, 340-41, 351-53 (1994).
2. Pub. L No. 90-439,82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(
(1994)).
3. SeeJill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power Reconsidering US. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 523, 525-26 (1993).
4. See id. at 526.
5. See Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1997).
7. Seeid.
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same information.8 A bidder must commence an offer within five days
of a public announcement of an offer that includes the price and
number of securities sought.9
The Schedule 13D filing requirement is aimed at creeping
acquisitions and open market or privately negotiated large block
purchases, whereas the Schedule 14D filing requirement is'aimed at
"tender offers." However, the term "tender offer" is nowhere defined
in the Exchange Act. Initially, the SEC resisted any definition of the
term in view of the dynamic nature of tender offer transactions and the
need for a flexible interpretation of the Williams Act."° Thereafter, the
SEC proposed a rule that would have defined a tender offer as any offer
to purchase more than five percent of a class of securities made to more
than ten persons (except for certain brokers' transactions) or an offer
that is disseminated in a wide-spread manner, provides for a price which
represents a premium in excess of five percent or two dollars above the
current market price, and does not provide for a meaningful opportunity
to negotiate the price and terms." Three months later, the SEC asked
Congress to legislatively define the term "tender offer," but no such
legislation ever resulted.' 2 In lieu of a definition of the term "tender
offer," the SEC proffered an eight-factor test so that a tender offer
would be characterized by: active and widespread solicitation of public
shareholders for the shares of an issuer, solicitation of a substantial
percentage of the issuer's securities, offer of a premium over prevailing
market price, fixed rather than negotiable terms, limited duration of
offer, offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, offerees
subject to pressure to sell their stock, and a public announcement
preceded or followed by a rapid accumulation of stock.' This definition
has been accepted by the courts,' 4 but results in situations where there
can be a change of control in a privately negotiated transaction that
deprives public shareholders of the protection of the Williams Act. 5
The Williams Act and implementing SEC regulations also address
certain substantive or procedural aspects of tender offers. These include
making tendered shares withdrawable for a specified period of time,

8. &eid § 240.14d-100.
9. See i § 240.14d-2(b).
10. See
Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676, 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976).
11. The rule proposed was Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1). &e Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-16385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (1979).
12. SeeTHOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.13, at 617 (3d ed.
1996).
13. See id.at 619.
14. See,
e.g.,Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
15. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
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requiring pro rata acceptance when an offer for less than one hundred
percent of shares is made, requiring that tender offers be made to all
security holders, and that all offerees be paid the same price.' In
addition, § 14(e) of the Exchange Act 7 contains a general tender offer
antifraud provision prohibiting the use of all fraudulent, deceptive, and
manipulative acts and practices in connection with a tender offer and
gives the SEC authority to define, and prescribe means reasonably
designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative. Pursuant to such authority, the SEC adopted Rule
14e-3"' which, among other things, prohibits anyone in the possession
of insider information about an unannounced tender offer from trading
on such information.
The Williams Act generally facilitates tender offers, but corporate
governance in the United States is left to state law. Further, corporate
fiduciary duty regulation under state law is not, as a general matter,
preempted by the Williams Act, so the SEC does not regulate the
defenses available to a bidder.'" In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., it
was argued that a renegotiation by a target company of the terms of a
tender offer breached the company's fiduciary duty to its shareholders,
was manipulative, and violated the antifraud provisions of the Williams
Act. 20 The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument,
however, holding that the Williams Act dealt with disclosure, not
unfairness in the takeover context. As a matter of state law, although
directors are obliged to exercise due care and loyalty, 2 1 and must obtain
the highest price once a company is on the auction block,22 they have
considerable latitude in resisting a takeover bid.23 Further, state
statutory law can be quite protective of directors attempting to block an
unwelcome bidder.24

16. SeeExchange Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1997).
17.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994).

18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1997).
19. SeeCTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).

20. 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
21. See DENNISJ. BLOCK ET AL, THE BUSINESSJUDGMENT RULE 52-55, 124-26 (4th ed. 1993).
22. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
23. See BLOCK ETAL., supra note 21, at 233-708.
in Contl Tnracdon--A
24. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Duy ofDirwiors tNNon-Shaholder ComnAri
Comparison of US. and UK La, 25 WAKE FOREST L REV. 61, 66-68 (1990); Roberta Romano, The Political

Economy of TakeoverStatuts, 73 VA. L REV. II I (1987).
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B. The UnitedIAngdom
In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, shareholders are
regarded as the owners of corporate enterprise, and shareholder interests
take precedence over all other corporate constituencies.25 A significant
portion-of company and securities law is based on judicially-developed
theories of fiduciary duty. The British strongly prefer financial selfregulation to statutory regulation, viewing the latter as insufficiendy
flexible.26 Takeovers in the United Kingdom, therefore, are regulated
by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, a self-regulatory body that
operates pursuant-to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (City
Code). Nevertheless, public companies adhere to the City Code and
rulings by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers are respected.
The term "tender offer" is not defined in the City Code. Rather, the
City Code requires persons who have acquired thirty percent of the
voting stock of any company to make a cash offer for the entire
company, which is conditioned upon receiving at least fifty percent of
the voting securities.27 Once the bidder has received fifty percent of the
voting securities, it can make the offer unconditional, but cannot do so
until then.2" If the offer lapses without becoming unconditional, the
bidder and persons acting with them cannot, without the permission of
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, make a further bid for a period of
twelve months.2" Once the bidder has acquired ninety percent of the
shares for which the offer was made, it can force the remaining ten
percent to accept the same terms as the takeover bid." a Acquisitions of
fifteen percent of an issuer's securities trigger a requirement to notify the
issuer and the London Stock Exchange of this fact by the next day.3
Further, under the Companies Act, movement in either direction across
a three percent ownership threshold requires notice to the issuer within
two days
of dealing and to the London Stock Exchange "without
32
delay.

)

25. SeePETER XUEREB, THE RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS 10-11 (1989).

26. See
4 RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KiAusJ. HoPr, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BusINESS
ENTERPRISE 190 (1988).
27. SeeCity Code on Takeovers and Mergers, in 2 WEINBERG & BLANK ON TAKE-OVERS AND
MERGERS 7001, at Rule 5.1 (Laurence Rabinowitz ed., 5' ed. 1989) [hereinafter City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers].
28. Seeid. at Rule 10.
29. Seeid. at Rules 9.1.9.3, 10.
30. See
id. at Rule 9.3
31.

Seeid. atRule 17.1.

32. Companies Act, 1985, §§ 185-210 (4th ed. Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales 1991)
(Eng.).
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Mandatory bids are somewhat rare, but hostile takeovers are not. s3

There are no specific disclosure requirements for cash bids. The City
Code consists of ten "General Principles" and thirty-eight specific
"Rules" which are applicable to all offers. The City Code further
provides that it is "impracticable to devise rules in sufficient detail to
cover all circumstances which can arise in offers. Accordingly, persons
engaged in offers should be aware that the spirit as well as the precise
wording of the General Principals and the ensuing Rules must be
observed.,3 4 Among the technical requirements are that the bidder
must first make the offer to the board of the target company. If the
bidder has made a firm determination without preconditions to make a
bid or has to make a bid because it and the concert parties have
acquired thirty percent of the outstanding shares, the bid must be
publicly announced. 5
Detailed disclosure by the bidder is required in the offer document
with regard to, among other things, all of the terms and conditions of
the offer, financial and other conditions concerning the offeror,
including shareholders in a company formed to conduct the bid, the
bidder's financial resources, and agreements, arrangements, or
understandings between the offeror and directors or shareholders of the
offeree. 36 The bidder must post its offering documents to the
shareholders within twenty-eight days of the announcement. 37 The
board must then obtain competent independent advice. 38
Approximately fourteen days after the bidder posts the offering
memoranda, the board must furnish the shareholders with its view of the
offer, along with the advice received from the independent advisor.39
The offer must remain open for twenty-one days from the date the
offering documents are initially posted.'

33. See Edward F. Greene et al., Toward a Cohesive InternationalApproach to Crass-Border Takeover
Regulation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 823, 838 (1997).
34. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, supra note 27, General Principles.

35. See id. at Rule 2.2.
36. See id. at Rule 24.
37. See id.
at Rule 30.1.
38. Seeid.
at Rule 3.1.
39. See id. at Rule 30.2. Detailed disclosure requirements for this document, similar to those
imposed upon the bidder, are also specified. See id at Rule 25.
40. See id. at Rule 31.1. If there is an increase in offering price or another material change, the offer
must be kept open for at least an additional 14 days. Set id at Rule 31.4. The offer is generally conditioned
upon the bidder obtaining at least 50% of the target's voting rights; this condition must be satisfied within
60 days of the date on which the initial offer was made. See id at Rule 35. In addition, the offer cannot
continue if it has not become unconditional as to acceptances within 60 days. In either case, if the offer
lapses without meeting these requirements, the bidder and persons acting in concert with it cannot make
a new offer for a period of 12 months without the consent of the Panel. See id.
at 35.1.
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Withdrawal and fair pricing requirements are set forth. One who
tenders his acceptance can withdraw his acceptance only if the offer has
not become unconditional as to acceptance by twenty-one days after the
initial closing date (hence, generally, forty-two days from the
commencement of the offer). The right to withdraw after that time
continues until the offer becomes or is declared unconditional as to
acceptances.4 The initial offering must be at a price equal to or greater
than the highest price paid by the bidder for any of the target's shares
purchased in the prior three months. If the bidder acquires shares in the
target during the pendency of the offer at a price higher than the
offering price, then it must both immediately disclose the terms of the
transaction and increase the offering price to equal or exceed that paid
in the transaction.42
More important than these technical requirements, however, are the
principles that shareholders of an offeree company must decide whether
or not an offer should succeed, and that all equity holders must be
treated equally.43 In addition, after an offer is communicated to the
board, or even if a board has reason to believe an offer is imminent, the
offeree board is prohibited from taking any action without the approval
of shareholders at a general meeting "which could effectively result in
any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the shareholders being denied
the opportunity to decide on its merits." 44
C. Germany
Under the German system of codetermination, employees are
represented on the supervisory board of the corporation and have as
great a claim to corporate profits as shareholders. Commercial banks
are major shareholders of the most significant public companies, so
lenders, rather than shareholders, have traditionally taken the lead in
allocating capital. 45 Following German reunification and the greater
pressures for capital experienced by German corporations, changes are
slowly being exerted upon German public corporations, but hostile

41.

Seeid.atRule34.

42. &e id.
43. See Simon MacLachlan & William MacKesy, Acquisi'ons of Companies inEurope-Fracticaly,
Disclosure and Regukltfio An Ovmwie, 23 INT'LLAW. 373, 387-88 (1989).
44. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, supra note 27, General Principles.
45. See 4 BUXBAUM & HOPT, supra note 26, at 181-82; Nev Dreams atDeusche Bank, ECONOMIST,
June 22, 1991, at 79.
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takeovers are still rare and equity investors are not as protected as they
are elsewhere."
Germany has a new Takeover Code, but it does not automatically
apply to all takeovers. The German Takeover Commission is comprised
of appointed members from the capital markets and financial
community, including lenders and academics. None of the voluntary
guidelines for takeover bids are binding or give rise to any sanction if
breached." The voluntary guidelines merely expect the bidder to notify
the target and the stock exchange prior to making a bid, and to publish
the offer immediately thereafter. Minimal disclosure standards are
prescribed."
D. Australia
Australia has an active equity market, dominated by institutional
investors. Because of scandals in the securities markets in the 1980s,
Australia now has an extensive scheme of takeover regulation. It is
embodied in a federal law which is implemented by each state adopting
the federal legislation; this serves as a means of assuring uniformity
among states. 4 9 A National Companies and Securities Commission
(NCSC)has authority to monitor trading in target company securities,
and to administer the takeover legislation.
Prescribed information must be set forth in tender offer materials,
which must be registered with the NCSC and served on the target
company and appropriate securities exchange before it can be used and
before a tender offer can commence. 0 The target company then must
prepare and file with the NCSC a statement containing its
recommendation and prescribed information, including unpublicized
changes, if any, in its financial condition.5 Both the bidder's materials

46. See Greene et al., supranote 33, at 835; see also DavidJ. Berger, A ComparativeAnalysisofTakeover
Regulation in t European Communy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 53, 68-74.
47. See Takeover Code of the Exchange Export Commission at the Federal Ministry of Finance,July
14, 1995, translated in the New German Takeover Code, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Annex 1
(1996), at 7.
48. See id at 835.
49. See Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1980 (Austl.), AustrailasianLegal Informajion Instituk:
Commonaweafh N'umbered Acts (last modified Mar. 11, 1997) <http://www.austii.edu.au/au/lcgis/cth/
numnact.html> [hereinafter National Takeovers Code]; J.P. Hambrook,Ausraia, in 10C INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION §10.11(3) (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff
eds., 1997).
50. See National Takeovers Code, supra note 49, § 18(1); Hambrook, supra note 49, § 10.11(5).
51. See National Takeovers Code, supra note 49, § 22(1); Hambrook, supra note 49, § 10.11(5).
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and the target company's materials must be transmitted to the
shareholders.52
There are special procedures if the takeover is to be effectuated by
purchases on a stock exchange. 3 There are also detailed substantive
provisions governing, among other things, the period the offer remains
open, conditions to the offer, market purchases, and best price
requirement.54 If specified percentages are acquired, then the bidder
can compel the remaining shareholders to sell on the same terms,55 and,
if ninety percent is acquired by the bidder, the remaining shareholders
that did not tender can compel the bidder to buy their shares on the
same terms which they previously refused.56
E. Observations on Conflicts
As the foregoing demonstrates, there are numerous conflicts between
the takeover regulations of the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Australia. These conflicts are deeply rooted not only in
the legal systems of these countries, but in their systems of corporate
finance and capital formation. The conflicts involve not only
mechanical and technical requirements such as the circumstances under
which a tender offer can or must be made, how long an offer must be
kept open and withdrawal rights, but also informational requirements
concerning whether or not certain disclosures are mandatory. Fairness
provisions, such as whether and when some investors may receive
preferential treatment, and the availability of takeover defenses also
differ. If the tender offer regulations of more countries were to be
detailed, further conflicts would appear.
III. A COMPARISON OF BANS AGAINST TRADING ON INSIDE
INFORMATION

A. RelationshipBetween Disclosure and Insider Trading Prohibitions
An important means of enforcing mandatory disclosure requirements
is to prohibit trading by persons who are in possession of material
undisclosed information about an issuer or its securities. Information

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See
National Takeovers Code, supra note 49, § 16(2); Hambrook, supra note 49, § 10.11(5).
SeeHambrook, supra note 49, § 10.11(6).
Se id. § 10.11(5).
See
National Takeovers Code, supra note 49, §§ 42(1), (2); Hambrook, supra note 49, § 10.11(10).
See National Takeovers Code, supra note 49, § 43(3); Hambrook, supra note 49, § 10.11(11).
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about an upcoming tender offer is market information, rather than
classic inside information, which is non-public information about events
or circumstances related to a company's assets or earning power, known
only to corporate management and its confidants, and reasonably
expected to materially affect the market price of the company's stock.57
Further, a bidder or potential bidder does not have a fiduciary
relationship to the shareholders of a target company requiring it to keep
information about the bid confidential. Nevertheless, where such
information is utilized for trading prior to a public announcement of a
tender offer, target company shareholders are deprived of the benefits
of the Williams Act in the United States or similar statutory or nonstatutory regulatory regimes in other countries. Further, the bidder is
disadvantaged by purchases that drive up the price of the target
company's common stock.
Accordingly, bans against trading on non-public information about
upcoming tender offers were developed by case law and SEC rules in
the United States. In Europe, a general directive on insider trading
promulgated by the EU 8 included some prohibitions regarding tender
offers. So do Australian statutes on insider trading. Indeed, there is
greater international harmonization regarding prohibitions against
trading on insider information about tender offers than there is with
regard to requirements placed on a bidder in a tender offer.
Nevertheless, disparities exist both in the substantive law and in law
enforcement.
B. The United States
Rule 14e-3, adopted by the SEC in 1980, promotes the disclosure
obligations of the Williams Act by setting forth an obligation to disclose
information about an upcoming tender offer or abstain from trading
upon any person other than a bidder or prospective bidder who is in
possession of material information relating to a tender offer "which
information he knows or has reason to know is non-public and which he
knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from (1)The offering person, (2) [the target], or (3)Any officer, director,
partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering
person."59 It is noteworthy that this disclose or abstain obligation is
57. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
58. SeeCouncil Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider
Dealing, 1989 Oj. (L.334) 30, availabe in LEXIS, Intlaw library, ECLaw File [hereinafter EU Insider
Trading Directive].
59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1997).
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imposed whether information about a bid emanates from the offeror or
target.
Rule 14e-3 was adopted by the SEC soon after the decision of the
United States Supreme Court limiting the scope of insider trading
violations under Rule lOb-5 in Chiarella v. United States.6" This case
involved a printer who learned about upcoming tender offers to
purchase stock in target companies. The Court held that silence in
connection with a purchase or sale may operate as a fraud only if
liability is premised on a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence, and not merely one's ability to utilize information
because of his position in the marketplace. Although the defendant's
conduct may have been reprehensible, the Supreme Court pointed out
that not every instance of financial unfairness violates Rule 1Ob-5. In a
dissenting opinion, ChiefJustice Berger set forth the view that anyone
who misappropriates material non-public information in breach of an
employment, fiduciary, or similar duty to anyone and then trades on or
tips that information to his own advantage violates Rule lOb-5.6 '
The SEC release adopting Rule 14e-3 justified the rule on the
grounds that trading by persons in possession of material, non-public
information relating to a tender offer results in unfair disparities in
market information and market disruption because security holders who
purchase from or sell to such persons are effectively denied the
disclosure and the substantive provisions of the Williams Act. If
furnished with information about the tender offer, however, they could
make an informed investment decision.62 No breach of a fiduciary duty
need be demonstrated. In addition, Rule 14e-3 was clearly intended to
enforce the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act relating to tender
offers.
Because Rule 14e-3 avoids some important elements required in a
Rule 1Ob-5 action, in particular, the need to prove breach of a fiduciary
duty and the need to prove scienter, there were persistent questions
concerning its validity. These questions were first addressed by the
Second Circuit in the case of United States v. Chestman.63 Judge Meskill,
writing for the majority, upheld the defendant's conviction and the
SEC's authority to promulgate Rule 14e-3 on two grounds. First, the
statutory power to define and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent fraudulent acts and practices allows the SEC to define fraud in

60.
61.
62.
63.

445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Seeid.at243,245.
See Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17120,45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 (1980).
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane).

1998]

CORPORA TE LA W SYMPOSIUM

1145

ways that go beyond the common law.64 Second, the power to prevent
fraud in the tender offer context necessarily encompasses the power to
proscribe
conduct outside the purview of common law or SEC-defined
65
fraud.
In United States v. O'Hagan' the United States Supreme Court likewise
held that, by giving the SEC the authority to regulate nondeceptive
activities as a reasonably designed means of preventing manipulative
acts under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, the "Commission may prohibit
acts, not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b) if the
prohibition is 'reasonably designed to prevent [fraudulent acts and
practices] ."67 Further, under either a definitional or preventive analysis,
the Court gave the SEC rule-making deference regarding Rule 14e-3.6"
O'Haganleaves blurred some of the contours of the tort of trading on
undisclosed tender offer information. In particular, it is unclear whether
mere "possession" of inside information is sufficient because the Court
described the wrong as trading "on the basis" of inside information.69
Additionally, the Court deliberately left open the question of whether
"warehousing" violates Rule 14e-3.7"
Insider trading can be sanctioned by the SEC like any
other violation
of Rules 1Ob-5 or 14e-3, in an injunctive action or agency disciplinary
proceedings." Also, criminal cases can be instituted by the United
States Department ofJustice.72 In addition, in 1984 Congress gave the
SEC the authority to seek up to three times the profits made or losses
avoided as a civil penalty against insider traders, over and above any
other remedies otherwise available.73 Then, in 1988 Congress further
increased the sanctions for insider trading, creating a private right of
action on behalf of contemporaneous traders,74 inserting a new bounty
76
75
provision for informers on insider trading, increasing criminal fines,

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 561.
&eid.
117 S. Ct. 2199(1997).
Id. at 2217 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)).
See id. at 2218 n.19.
Id at 2219.
Id. at 2217 n. 17; see also infta note 238 and accompanying text.
S&e15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), (d)(3), 78u-2, 78u-3 (1994).
See id § 78u(d)(l).

73.

See id § 78u-l(a)(3); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and

Its Effect on Existng Law, 37 VAND. L REV. 1273, 1280-81 (1984).
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-(a).
75. &eid § 78u-l(e).
76. See id § 78fTla).
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and giving the SEC greater authority to investigate international
securities law violations."
C. The EUInsider TradingDirective
The European Economic Community, now the EU, Insider Trading
Directive was adopted in November 1989 as part of the 1992 singlemarket program.78 Its purpose was to harmonize insider trading laws
throughout the EU.79 Prior to the EU Insider Trading Directive, the
laws in Europe concerning insider trading were not uniform.8" The EU
Insider Trading Directive was required to be implemented by national
law byJune 1, 1992. Unlike U.S. law, the EU Insider Trading Directive
defines "inside information" to mean "information which has not been
made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of
transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which,
if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the
price of the transferable security or securities in question."'"
The EU Insider Trading Directive's definition divides individuals who
possess non-public information into "primary" and "secondary" insiders.
A "primary" insider is any person who "by virtue of his membership of
the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer, by
virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or because he has access
to such information by virtue of the exercise of his employment,
profession or duties, possesses inside information."' 2 A primary insider
is prohibited from "taking advantage of that information with full
knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account
or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly,
transferable securities of the issuer or issuers to which that information
relates."8 3 In addition, primary insiders must refrain from acting as

77. See id §78b(1).
78. See supranote 58 and accompanying text. The Single European Act of 1986, 1987 OJ. (L 169),
art. 13, set
a goal ofachieving complete regulatory harmony and economic unity by December 31, 1992.
See Manning G. Warren 111, Tk Regulation of Insider Trading in the European Community, 48 WASH. & LEE L
REV. 1037, 1037 n.2 (1991).
79. See Amy E. Stutz, Note, A New Look at the European Economic Community Directhe on InsiderTrading,
23 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L 135, 155-61 (1990).
80. France was the first European country to ban insider trading and it did so in 1967. Se. id. at 16465. When the EU Insider Trading Directive was passed, insider trading was a criminal offense in the
United Kingdom, see id., but not violative of any statute in Germany. See Ursula C. Pfeil, Comment,
Finanplatz Deutschland Germa Enacts Insider Trading Legislation, II AM. U. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 137, 137
(1996).
81. EU Insider Trading Directive, supra note 58, art. 1, § I'.
82. Id.
art.2,§ l.
83. Id.
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tippers, as they are prohibited from disclosing inside information to any
third party unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of the
exercise of the tipper's employment, profession, or duties. They are also
prohibited from "recommending or procuring a third party, on the basis
of that inside information, to acquire or dispose of transferable securities
admitted to trading on its securities markets."84 The EU Insider
Trading Directive then extends its mandate to "secondary insiders" or,
"any person other than [a primary insider] who with full knowledge of
the facts possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of
which could not be other than a [primary insider]. 85
In summary, primary insiders are prohibited from either trading or
tipping, and secondary insiders are prohibited from trading, but are not
subject to the anti-tipping provisions. The gap in the legislation as it
applies to tipping by secondary insiders may reflect the impracticality of
86
detecting and prosecuting remote tipping of non-public information.
It is clear, that unlike the U.S. insider trading laws, determination of
illegal trading is not based on breach of a fiduciary duty, but rather,
possession of non-public information.
The EU Insider Trading Directive attempts to balance the need to
provide a clear, predictable rule and the fear of over-regulating trading
that does not present problems common in the use of non-public
information. The definitions of primary and secondary insiders reflect
an attempt to balance the need for competent insider trading
enforcement against the risk of establishing too broad a prohibition. 7
The EU Insider Trading Directive lays out broad guidelines, but stricter
laws may be enforced by Member States. 8 In addition, although the
prohibition of insider trading is prescribed for all Member States of the
EU, the penalties are to be determined by each Member State. The
Directive states that the penalties must be "sufficient to promote
compliance with the measures."89

84. It art. 3.
85. Id. art. 4.
European Conuni Direcfve
all
a mider Tra&ig--Leonsfrorm the
86. Se Thomas Lee Hazen, Defuning
on Insider Trading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 231, 236.
87. See id.
88. See EU Insider Trading Directive, supra note 58, art. 6. The Directive states, in part, that "[e]ach
Member State may adopt provisions more stringent than those laid down by this Directive or additional
provisions, provided that such provisions are applied generally." Id.
89. Id. art. 13.
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D. The United I~ngdom
Prior to 1980, self-regulatory prohibitions against insider trading in
the United Kingdom were poorly enforced.9" Then the Companies Act
of 1980 provided that it was a criminal offense to buy or sell on the
London Stock Exchange on the basis of unpublished specific
information likely to materially affect the market price of the stock if the
defendant knew the information was price sensitive. 9' The 1980 Act was
superseded by the Company Securities Act of 1985,92 and then by the
Criminal Justice Act of 1993 (CJA), which was adopted to bring the
United Kingdom into compliance with the EU Insider Trading
Directive.93 In addition, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers has rules
dealing specifically with insider trading in the context of a takeover
attempt, but sanctions are limited and the Panel most often uses
informal leverage to force disgorgement.94
The CJA replaced offenses in the 1985 Act with three new offenses:
"dealing while in possession of inside information; encouraging another
to deal in such circumstances; and disclosing information other than in
the proper performance of one's employment of professional duties."95
Inside information is information that is relevant, specific or precise, has
not been made public, and is price sensitive.96 Information that a
company has decided to make a bid for a target is "specific" but not
"precise," in the absence of information about the price at which the bid
is to be made.97
One of the ways in which the CJA broadened the law is that an
insider does not have to have a connection with the issuer of the
securities in relation to which the insider has inside information.98
Rather, an insider is someone who knows he has inside information and
also knows that he has obtained it either: through being a director,
employee, or shareholder of an issuer of securities; or through having

90. S&eJACQUEUINE A.C. SUTER, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER DEAUNG INBRITAIN 3 (1989).
91. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL& SAMUEL WOLFF, 3E SECuRrTEs AND FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 15.08(6)(b) (1997).
92. See id. It was then amended by the Financial Services Act of 1986.
93. See Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh, United K'ndom, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 91, 92
(Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
94. See id. at 122. The London Stock Exchange monitors trading in securities listed on the exchange
and investigates apparent cases of insider trading. See id at 118. Because the sanctions by the Exchange
may only be imposed against its members, its enforcement reach is significantly restricted. See id. at 121-22.
95. CriminalJustice Act, 1993, § 52 (4th ed. Halsbury's Statutes ofEngland and Wales 1991) (Eng.);
see also Stamp & Welsh, supra note 93, at 92.
96. See CriminalJustice Act, 1993, §§ 56, 60(4).
97. Stamp & Welsh, supra note 93, at 97.
98. See id. at 101.
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access to the information by virtue of his employment, office, or
profession; or by having it directly or indirectly from such person.
The wide scope of the CJA makes defenses to insider trading
important. One defense is that there was no profit or avoidance of a loss
as a result of the dealing and that, therefore, the informationwas not
price sensitive. 9 An individual may also show that at the time of the
dealing he believed on reasonable grounds that the information had
been, or alternatively (in the case of encouragement of dealing) would
be disclosed widely so that those dealing ofn the other side would have
an equivalence of information. 0 0 An individual also may show he
would have traded even if he had not had the information.' Finally,
it is a defense for the accused to show that, at the time, he did not expect
any person, because of the disclosure, to deal in securities on a regulated
market or in the capacity of or in reliance upon a professional
intermediary.0 2
Market makers and other security industry
professionals have special defenses. An individual is not guilty of the
dealing or encouraging offense if he proves on the balance of
probabilities that he acted in good faith in the course of either his
business as a market maker, or his employment in the business of a
market maker. 3 Further, an individual may show that the information
he had as an insider was market information and that04it was reasonable
for someone in his position to have acted as he did.'
Insider trading is a criminal offense, punishable by fines and a
possible maximum prison sentence of seven years.' 5 When the CJA was
in the process of being drafted, the chairman of the London Stock
Exchange and others called for the introduction of civil penalties for
insider dealing and the establishment of an enforcement agency to
monitor compliance with the law. However, these calls were rejected
by the government.0 6
E. Gennany
On August 1, 1994, Germany took a step toward aggressively
competing in the international financial arena when it finally outlawed

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

&eCriminalJusdce Act, 1993, § 53; Stamp & Welsh, supra note 93, at 110.
&eidat 111.
See
id at 112.
Seeid at 112-13.
&eid at 113.
&,eid at 114.
&eid at 116.
&eidat 92.
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insider trading."°7 The insider trading regulations are part of a larger,
comprehensive program to develop a fairer and more attractive
investment environment in the German marketplace. The newly
created Federal Supervisory Authority for Securities Trading (FSA), is
somewhat similar to the SEC. It is a federal agency under the Federal
Ministry of Finance. In spite of pressure from within Germany and
from the world's leading financial markets, Germany remained the last
major financial market to adopt insider trading legislation. Indeed,
Germany was two years late in complying with the EU Insider Trading
Directive.0 8 Instead, Germany had relied on a voluntary code of
09
conduct which was Wholly ineffective. 1
The German Securities Trading Act applies to insider securities
which, generally, are those securities listed on the official or a regulated
market in Germany, traded over the counter in Germany, or listed on
an exchange in another EU Member State. The law applies to both
"primary insiders""' and "secondary insiders."'' . Primary insiders are

107. The law, known as the Securities Trading Act, is divided into 7 sections: (1)States the scope
of application and definition of key terms; (2)Establishes a federal supervisory authority for securities
trading and its duties, obligations and powers; (3)Sets forth the scope ofinsider trading, defines insiders,
prohibits insider trading, requires the disclosure ofmaterial information. This part implements the insider
trading prohibitions including the requirements of the EU Insider Trading Directive. The first section of
Part 3, § 12 defines "insider securities," a critical definition because the insider trading prohibition applies
only to information relating to "insider securities" or to issuers of "insider securities"; (4) Establishes
notification and publication obligations upon changes in the voting participation in listed companies (to
5%, was formerly 25%) and with respect to potentially material information; (5) Establishes rules of
conduct for investment services firms (including brokers); (6) Prescribes criminal penalties and
administrative fines; (7)Sets forth transitional provisions relating to the disclosure requirements in Part 4.
The author has utilized the English translation of the Securities Trading Act by Marlene Van Dyke and
Chistoy von Dryarder of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. Their translation is printed along with
explanations in a booklet distributed by the Deutshe Bbrse AG, and entitled INSIDER TRADING AND AD
Hoc DISCLOSURE PURSUANT To THE GERMAN SECURITIES TRADING ACT 30-56 (1994) (copy on file
with the Universiy of Cinnati Law Reiv).
108. The EU Insider Trading Directive required Member States to adopt insider trading laws by June
1992. See StephenJ. Ixacock, In Search ofa Giant Leap: Curtailg Insider Trading in IntenatianalSecurties Markets
By the Reform of Insider TradingLaws Under Eropean Union CouncilDirective 89/592, 3 TULSAJ. COMp. & INT'L
L 51, 55 (1995). When Germany had not responded, the European Commission instituted infringement
proceedings in October of 1992. The insider law was finally passed onJuly 8, 1994. See id at 62-63.
109. The Insider Trading Guidelines were first published in 1970 and revised in 1976 and again in
1988. See id. at 61. The Guidelines amounted to no more than a moral code to which people could
voluntarily bind themselves by contract. See id at 66-67. The sole remedy was disgorgement of trading
profits, unless a party refused to disgorge, in which case a suit for breach ofcontract was available. See id
The Guidelines created a Board of Inquiry, but without a filed complaint, there was generally no Board
power to investigate. See i Further, because the compliance system usually required corporations to bring
actions against their own management, complaints were rarely filed. See id Finally, resources were limited
to the point that the Board lacked effectiveness. See id. at 61, 65-67; see also Pfeil, supra note 80, at 141.
110. INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS AND AD Hoc DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO THE GERMAN

SECURITIES TRADING ACT, supra note 107, § 13(1), at 40.
Ill. Id§ 14(2),at40.
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those who have access to and knowledge of insider information through
a position in management or as a shareholder of an issuer, or one who
"participat[es] in the capital of an issuer," or through "profession or
activities or duties." Secondary insiders are simply those with
knowledge of inside information.
The statute also defines "inside information" as "a non-public fact
that relates to one or more issuers of Insider Securities or to Insider
Securities if such fact, should it become publicly known, could
materially influence the price of the Insider Securities.""' 2 Therefore,
the information need not be material, but must only be capable of
considerably influencing the value of an insider security if it were
publicized. A specific exemption designed to protect securities analysts
is an evaluation based exclusively on public information; even if it could
influence the price of the security, it is excepted from the definition of
inside information.11 Prohibited insider transactions are set forth." 4
First, insiders may not take advantage of their knowledge of insider
information. Second, insiders are prohibited from providing insider
information to others without authorization. Third, insiders cannot use
inside information to recommend that a third party buy or sell insider
securities.
A three-tiered enforcement structure is established with most of the
power lying with the FSA." 5 Issuers must disclose all potentially
market-moving information to the investing public via exchange
newspapers and electronic information systems." 6 The FSA has the
power to demand documents and enter business premises to ensure
compliance. Further, if information is not forthcoming as required, the
exchanges may halt trading until information is disseminated. Clearly,
the purpose of this section is to significantly reduce inside information,
and subsequently reduce trading on that information. There are
stringent criminal sanctions for insider trading of imprisonment of up to

112. Il§13(1), at 40.
113. Seeid § 13(2), at 40.
114. Seeid§ 14(l), at 40.
115. SeeidPt. 2, §§ 3-11, at 33-38. Power also resides at the Lander or state and exchange levels.
All credit institutions with headquarters in Germany, their foreign branch offices, and other market
participants must disclose their securities and derivative transactions (as defined in the law) on a daily basis.
The Federal Supervisory Authority for Securities Trading (FSA) is responsible for verifying whether the
disclosure requirements have been met. If the FSA suspects insider trading activity, it may proceed further
with an investigation. Seei § 9(1), at 36. Two common motivations for a heightened investigation are:
(1) to ascertain specific individuals involved in the suspected trading activity, and (2) to address inquiries
of issuers of securities. Penalties may be assessed for intentional or negligent failure to comply with
reporting requirements, and for failure to comply with the FSA's requests for additional information. Once
a suspicion is confirmed, the matter is turned over to a state attorney's office for prosecution.
116. Seeid§ 15, at40-41.
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five years, which are harsher than those of other states in the European
Union and harsher than the penalties for other white collar crimes.
Further, the Treasury may seek disgorgement of profits derived from
illegal insider trading. Whether any private right of action on behalf of
contemporaneous traders is available is a subject of debate." 7
F. Australia
Australia has regulated insider trading since the early 1970s. Few
cases were brought by prosecutors, however, and these cases did not
result in convictions." 8 Critics blamed this on Australia's complex
statutory scheme and judicial reluctance to enforce the statute. The first
effort to improve the insider trading laws resulted in more detailed
legislation which was adapted in 1980. However, a 1988 survey of
market participants concluded that "the incidence of insider trading in
Australia ranges between Not uncommon and Widespread.""' 9
In 1989, the Attorney General, responding to concerns that
widespread insider trading was making foreign investors reluctant to
enter the Australian market and was discouraging small investors from
investing in securities, requested that the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (known as the
Griffiths Committee) study the extent of insider trading and other forms
of market manipulation in Australia. The Griffiths Committee Report
then set forth a basis for 1991 amendments to Australian law concerning
insider trading. 2 ' The new law, among other things, increased the
penalties for insider trading and expanded the definition of insider.
Under the old law, the Securities Industry Act (SIA), a person could
not deal in the securities of a corporation if the person was connected
with the corporation (or had been connected with the corporation
during the six months preceding the contemplated transaction) and, by
virtue of the connection, was in possession of materially price-sensitive
information that was not generally available. The insider trading
sections of the SIA were recodified and broadened by dropping the
limitation on insiders to those connected with the issuer.' 2 ' Currently,
the Corporate Law defines an insider as "(a) a person [who] possesses

117. See Harmut Krause, The Cerman Securid TradiqgAd (1994): A Ban on Insider
Tradingand an Issuer's
Affinnative
DuY to Disclose
MatralNonpublicInfonnaton, 30 INT'L LAW. 555, 576-77 (1996).
118. See R. TOMASiC ET AL, CORPORATION LAW, PRINCIPLES, PoucY AND PROCESS § 12.24 (2d
ed. 1992).
119. Roman Tomasic & Brendan Pcntony, Insider Tradin LEGAL SERV. BULL, Feb. 1989, at 3, 4.
120. Sm Marie McDonald,Ausftra/ in INTrERNAIONALINSMER DEALING, upra note 93, at 439-40.
121. See id at 442.
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information that is not generally available but, if the information were
generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a
material effect on the price or value of securities of a body corporate;
(b) the person knows or ought reasonably to know that: i) the
information is not generally available; and ii) if it were generally
available, it might have a material effect on the price or value of those
securities."' 22 An insider thus defined is then prohibited from2 3dealing in
securities or procuring another person to deal in securities.
A "body corporate" will be deemed to possess information that is
known by an officer of the corporation if the officer came into possession
of the information in the course of his official duties.' 24 The statute
further provides that a body corporate is presumed to be aware of
information that an officer of the corporation knows, or ought to
reasonably to know, because of his position as an officer of the
corporation."' Corporations are permitted to participate26 in securities
transactions if they employ "Chinese Wall" procedures.1
A person with price-sensitive information may not deal in securities
if: (1) he has obtained that information, directly or indirectly, from a
person whom he knows or ought reasonably to have known, is
precluded from dealing in those securities; and (2) if,
when the
information was obtained, the tippee was associated with the insider, or
had an arrangement with the insider for the communication of the
information, so that the tippee could deal in the securities alone or with
the insider. The law also contains an anti-tipping provision which
focuses on the tipper. An insider is prohibited from directly or indirectly
communicating price-sensitive, nonpublic information concerning a
company's securities to another person if the insider knows or should
know that the other person would be likely to engage in securities
transactions or to procure a third person to buy or sell securities on his
behalf.'27 Effectively, the knowledge requirement has the greatest
impact when it comes to prosecuting tippers and the scienter
requirement allows some to escape sanctions.
A person accused of insider trading may avoid liability by establishing
that the information received was broadly disseminated.' 28 Along the
same lines, the defendant trader may escape liability by showing that the
122. The Corporations Law, § 1002G(I) (Austl.), 7he CwporationsLaw (last modified Feb. 17, 1998)
<http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/histact/2/1056/top.htm> [hereinafter Corporations Law].
123. See id§ 1002G(2).
124. Id § 1002E(a).

125. S&ui§ 1002E(b).
126. IL§ 1002M.

127. See id. § 1002G(3).
128. &e id § IOOOT(2)(a).
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contra trader knew or ought reasonably to have known of the pricesensitive information before entering into the trade.'29 A licensed
securities dealer, which could not otherwise trade in certain securities by
virtue of possessing inside information, could trade if acting as an agent
and on specific instructions from a customer with whom the dealer is not
associated and has not given advice in respect to the specific securities.'
There are steep criminal penalties for insider trading intended to send
a clear signal to the market that insider trading will not be tolerated.' 3'
Corporations may be fined for an amount not exceeding
Au$ 1,000,000.132 Individuals may be fined for an amount not exceeding
33

Au$200,000 and/or may be sentenced to five years imprisonment.'
Civil remedies against natural persons or corporations also are available.
The other party to a transaction, who did not possess the inside
information, is entitled to compensation for any loss sustained by reason
of the difference in price between the price at which the transaction took
place and where the transaction would have occurred had the
information been known.' 3 In addition, the issuer is entitled to any
profit accruing from the insider trades.'15 However, an insider who sells
prior to the announcement cannot be liable to both the party to a
transaction and the issuer on the same
transaction, because avoiding a
' 36
loss does not constitute a "profit."'
G. A Comparisonof the Law
1. General
European and Australian insider trading prohibitions are modeled to
some extent on U.S. law. However, in the United States, the law of
insider trading has been developed on a case-by-case basis and, in the
case of Rule 1Ob-5 violations, requires proof of a breach of a fiduciary
duty by the trader. However, U.S. law is dynamic and constantly
changing. In the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, the law is

129. See d § 1000T(2)(b).
130. See id§ 1000S. The statute appears to create an exemption for investment banks so that they
can assist clients in establishing a position in the case of a tender offer. However, that use appears to be
undermined if the exception may not be used where a broker or investment bank has given advice on the
specific securities.
131. See McDonald, supra note 120, at 457.
132. The maximum fine for corporations under the old law was Au$50,000.
133. The maximum fine for individuals under the old law was Au$20,000.
134. See Corporations Law, supra note 122, §§ 1005, 1013.
135. See id.
136. Id. § 130(1)(d).
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statutory and frozen until changed by superseding legislation. The same
fact pattern should produce the same result but could produce different
coverage in each jurisdiction.
In addition, in a transnational insider trading scheme, there is the
potential that tortfeasers will violate the laws of several different
jurisdictions. If each jurisdiction applies its law extraterritorially, there
could not only be a clash of culpability standards, but also a multiplicity
of sanctions. In the United States and Australia there is civil liability for
insider trading violations, whereas in the United Kingdom, sanctions are
either criminal or self-regulatory and contemporaneous traders have no
claim for damages. In Germany, there is criminal liability for insider
trading as well as a disgorgement remedy enforced administratively and
whether civil damage actions exist is unclear.
2. United States
One way to compare various insider trading laws is to apply the laws
to a common fact pattern and analyze the outcomes under various laws.
United States v. O'Hagans7 provides a good fact pattern because it was
recently decided by the United States Supreme Court and, thus, reflects
the current state of U.S. insider trading law. Further, the case raises
issues about how far-removed from the primary information source a
trader can be and still fall into the category of an "insider." The liability
of classic insiders who tip or use inside information is almost universally
accepted in countries that choose to ban insider trading, but the liability
of remote tippees remains an issue in the United States, even after
O'Hagan. O'Haganinvolved trading in securities of a target company by
an attorney for the bidder who obtained information about the
upcoming bid from partners at the bidder's law firm.
The United States Supreme Court validated the "misappropriation
theory" under which liability for insider trading attaches, regardless of
whether the trader owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the
corporation whose shares are traded, so long as there is a breach of trust
and confidence. The defendant in O'Hagan had no duty to the target
whose shares were purchased. Moreover, he was not working on the
takeover deal. Nevertheless, the Court found that O'Hagan's trading
on information in breach of duties owed to his law firm and its client
was sufficient for an inside trading conviction under Rule 106-5 as well
as Rule 14e-3. However, the Court cast doubt on the use of these rules

137. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). For further discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes
66-70.
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to prohibit "warehousing"-that is, the practice by a bidder of
suggesting
to other traders that they purchased shares in a prospective
38
target.1

O'Haganfits into a line of misappropriation cases holding that a trader
may not use non-public information in breach of a duty of trust and
confidence owed to an employer and its customers or clients.'39 The
sufficiency of more tenuous relationships has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court. For example, in United States v. Willis,"4 a psychiatrist
whose patient was the wife of a corporate executive received and traded
on information regarding a business transaction. 4 ' The defendant
argued that he was not alleged to have "breached a duty to a 'market
participant or any participant in the corporate world.""' 42 However, the
court found that, as a doctor, the defendant had an obligation to
maintain patient confidences, and when he used the information gained
through the doctor-patient relationship, he breached a duty of trust and
confidence. Therefore, he misappropriated inside information.
An even more tenuous tipper-tippee relationship was involved in
United States v.Chestman 3 where the defendant was a stockbroker who
had as a client the husband of an heir to a large supermarket chain.'
When the chain was to be sold, the stockbroker learned of the
transaction from his client, who learned of it from his wife, who learned
of it from her mother, who learned of it from her brother, the president
of the chain (the client's wife's uncle). The court recognized that the
broker was a tippee, and as such, could not be convicted unless his client
breached a duty owed to the source of the information based on a
fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence and, in addition,
that the broker knew that the client had done so.", The court found
that under Rule lOb-5 the broker did not breach a fiduciary duty to his
uncle-in-law, the source of the inside information."4 47 However, the
defendant's conviction was upheld under Rule 14e-3.

138. Id at2217 n.17.
139. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (columnist's duty to his newspaper);
Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Materia 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (employee's duty to his employer and
its clients); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (investment banker's duty to his firm).
140. 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y., 1990).
141. Seeid.at271.
142. Id.
at 274.
143. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en bane). For further discussion of this case see supra text
accompanying notes 63-65.
144. See idat 555.
145. See id.
at 564.
146. Seid at570.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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3. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, status attaches to a person who comes into
possession of information, obtained by virtue of his employment, office,
or profession and as long as the information is relevant, specific or
precise, non-public, and price sensitive.' 48 The attorney-defendant in
O'Haganclearly would fall into the category of a culpable trader. What
would be a more interesting question would be whether market players
who warehouse securities in anticipation of a bid would be culpable.
The defenses available for professionals who come into possession of
market information and act reasonably for a person in such a position
49
suggests that warehousing in the United Kingdom could be lawful.)
The doctor-patient in Willis probably would be a culpable trader
because he obtained information in the course of his professional duties
and he knew that the information emanated from an inside source. 5 °
Similarly, although none of the chain of family tippers in Ckestman
probably would be culpable because they did not obtain information
"by virtue" of their employment or profession, the stockbrokerdefendant did and probably would be culpable. 5 '
4. Germany
In Germany, it is unclear whether the attorney-defendant in O'Hagan
would be considered an "insider" under the definition which includes
"any person who by virtue of the designated purpose of his or her
profession or activities or duties has knowledge of insider
information.'52 A chance acquisition of inside information by a
professional, not in the course of his duties might not be considered "by
virtue of" a designated purpose.'53 The defendant in O'Hagan could
have argued that, although working for the law firm of the acquirer, he
was not individually assigned to the takeover project, and he did not

148. See Criminal Justice Act, 1993, §§56, 57, 60(4) (4th ed. Halsbury's Statutes of England and
Wales 1991) (Eng.).
149. See Matthew White, The imp&afiforsevYi rqudat6onofnao isiderdaingprovsiwnsin the Criminal
JusticeAct 1993, 16 COMPANY LAW. 163, 166 (1995).
150. See Stamp & Welsh, supra note 93, at 10 1-03.
151. I
152. INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS AND AD Hoc DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO THE GERMAN

SECURITIEs TRADING ACT, supra note 107, § 13(1)(3), at 40.
153. Tony Hickinbotham & Christoph Vaupel, Gwnman, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING, supra
note 93, at 129, 136.
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have the requisite contractual relationship with the bidder and thus did
not violate the terms of the statute.
On the other hand, the defendants in Willis and Chestman both learned
of inside information by virtue of the designated purpose of their
professions, activities, or duties. While a narrow reading of the German
law could require a professional to be linked directly to the source of
inside information, as is a lawyer, investment banker, or accountant for
an issuer or bidder, the relationship of the secondary insider does not
have to be with the issuer of securities. An employee of an advisor or
contractor advising a bidder can be an insider in relation to the
securities of the target company." 4
5. Australia
Under Australian law, once a person (individual or body corporate)
comes into possession of inside information that person knows or has
reason to know is material and non-public, that person is deemed to be
an insider.'55 Thus, once it is established that a person has non-public
information, an examination of his position, title, role, or specific duties
is unnecessary. Therefore, not only would the defendant in O'Hagan
have been an insider in Australia, but so would the family members of
traditional insiders in Willis and Chestman who received information, as
well as the psychiatrist and stock-broker defendants who traded on the
information. 156
The Australian Corporations Law defines inside information as that
"not generally available but, if the information were generally available,
a reasonable person would expect it to have a material effect on the
price or value of securities .... ""' The Code further defines

information as a matter relating to "intentions" and "likely intentions"
of a person. 5 ' The assessment of materiality under Australian insider
trading law must also consider whether "a reasonable person would be
taken to expect information to have a material effect on the price or
value of securities of a body corporate if the information would, or
would be likely to, influence persons who commonly invest' in securities
in deciding whether or not to subscribe for, buy or sell the first

154. See id.
155. See McDonald, supra note 120, at 443.

156. See Ampolex Ltd. v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd., BC 9601889, 1996 NSW LEXIS 2827, at *26
(Supreme Court of New South Wales, May 23, 1996).

157. Corporations Law, supra note 122, § 1002G(l)(a).
158. Id. § 1002A(l).
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mentioned securities."' 59 The court in Ampolex Ltd. v. PerpetualTrustee Co.,
Ltd., one of the few Australian insider trading cases, summarized the
materiality issue as being one where the judge must ask whether such a
reasonable person would expect the intention or likely intention of the
acquirer to take over the target to materially affect the value of the
target's equity securities. Under the facts of Willis, Chestman, and
O'Hagan this definition of information would be satisfied (because a
reasonable person would expect the takeover, when announced, to
materially affect the price of the options and stock) and that information
was not generally available.
IV. CONFLICTS AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY

A. The Conduct andEffects Test
Although a statute ordinarily is "intended to be confined in its
operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has
general and legitimate powers, ' the federal securities laws, at the
urging of the SEC, have long been given extraterritorial effect. In
antifraud cases, the SEC generally has advocated the broadest possible
coverage in order to protect U. S. investors and U. S. markets, but has
been somewhat less aggressive with respect to securities or broker-dealer
registration requirements. Tender offer regulation has presented unique
problems, which the SEC has had under consideration for some time.
Congress contemplated that the federal securities laws would be
applied to transnational securities transactions. The term "interstate
commerce" as defined in both the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)
and the Exchange Act includes transportation or communication among
the states and between any state and any foreign country. 6 ' Section
30(b) of the Exchange Act exempts from that Act's provisions or any
regulation thereunder "any person insofar as he transacts a business in
securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he
transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe."' 62 The interests of international law
and comity might have been best served by giving the phrase "without
the jurisdiction of the United States" a territorial interpretation.
159. Ampolkx, 1996 NSW LEXIS 2827 at *26-27 (analyzing § 10020).
160. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); accord Foley Bros., Inc.
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
161. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(7), 78c(a)(17)(1994).
162. Id. § 78dd(b). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has never passed any rules tc
implement this section.
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However, the SEC and the courts gave the Exchange Act
extraterritorial effect, interpreting "jurisdiction" as a legal rather than
a geographical concept.'63
The 1968 Second Circuit decision of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook64 was a
landmark opinion explicating the law on the extraterritorial application
of the Exchange Act. This was a derivative action brought by an
American shareholder of a Canadian torporation, Banff Oil Ltd.
(Banfi), whose shares were listed and traded on the American Stock
Exchange. The complaint alleged that Banff sold treasury shares at a
deflated price to two foreign companies.'65 The plaintiff's theory of the
case was that Banff was defrauded by its directors and controlling
stockholder who combined to force it to sell treasury stock at the
66
prevailing market price when they knew this price was artificially low.
The defendants argued that the court was without subject matter
jurisdiction because the entire transaction occurred in Canada between
foreign corporations. 67 The Second Circuit rejected that argument
stating that "[w]e believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to
have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors
who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities."' 68
Subsequently, the courts developed an alternative rationale for
applying the securities laws extraterritorially-the conduct test.
Utilizing this test, the courts applied the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws to losses from sales of securities to Americans residing in
the United States, to Americans residing abroad if acts of material
importance in the United States contributed to the losses, and even to
foreigners outside the United States if acts within the United States
directly caused their losses.'69 More recently, in Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group

163. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446,453-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd in part, 519
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
164. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
165. Seeid at205.
166. Seeidat210.
167. Seeid at204, 206.
168. Id/. at 206. More recently, the "silence" of Congress on the issue of extraterritoriality has been
noted. Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991).
169. S* e.g., Robinson v. TCI/U.S. West Communications, Inc., 117 F.3d 900,906 (5th Cir. 1997);
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 519
F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972). Some circuits require a lesser quantum of conduct-that the domestic conduct be significant to the
fraud, rather than a direct cause of it. See, e.g., Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d
Cir. 1977); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420-21 (8th Cir.
1979); Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996).
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PLC,7 ' the subsidiary of a Bermuda-based holding company listed on
the New York Stock Exchange sued Lep Group PLC (Lep), a London
based holding company, with NASDAQ listed American depository
receipts, for omissions in its Form 20-F filed with the SEC. Based on
these omissions and similar fraudulent information in Lep's United
Kingdom annual reports, the plaintiff purchased shares of Lep on the
London Stock Exchange which resulted in a write-off of $522 million.
Further, an individual defendant who was a U.S. director of Lep sold
shares through his U.S. broker which were sold to plaintiff on the
London Stock Exchange. The court held there was subject matter
jurisdiction under a combination of the "conduct" and "effect" tests.
Aggressive extraterritorial application of the Williams Act occurred
in ConsolidatedGold Fields PLC v. Minorco S.A. 7 ' This case arose out of a
hotly contested tender offer by Minorco, S.A. for Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC (Gold Fields). Minorco was a Luxembourg corporation
controlled by South Africans who had a 29.9% stake in Gold Fields.
Minorco tendered for the 70.10% of Gold Fields stock with a market
value of approximately $120 million, which was owned by U.S.
investors; over half of these shares were held indirectly through
nominee accounts in the United Kingdom. The Minorco offer was not
mailed into the United States, but it was mailed to British nominees for
U.S. shareholders. Minorco stated that it would accept tenders from
U.S. residents as long as the acceptance form was sent to Minorco from
outside the United States. Gold Fields sued Minorco under the antitrust
laws and also under the federal securities laws, alleging that Minorco
made false and misleading statements concerning the extent to which it
was controlled by South African corporations and individuals.
The Second Circuit held that the district court should have found
subject matter jurisdiction. Minorco knew that the British nominees
were required by law to forward the tender offer documents to
shareholders in the United States and this "effect" was a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory of the United
States. Because American shareholders were allegedly defrauded, there
was subject matter jurisdiction.'72
The SEC as amicus curiae argued in support of subject matter
jurisdiction over the fraud claims, but urged the court to abstain, for
reasons of international comity, from enjoining the tender offer
worldwide pending corrective disclosure. 7 The court declined to-do so,

170.
171.
172.
173.

54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cw. denied sub nom. Berkley v. Itoba Ltd., 516 U.S. 1044 (1996).
871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
&eid.at262-63.
See
Consolidated Gold Reds, 890 F.2d at 569.
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but rather remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
an appropriate remedy, consistent with comity principles, could be
fashioned.'74 The stand taken by the Second Circuit in Gold Fields in
support of its vision of U.S. interests was very aggressive in that Minorco
arguably was acting contrary to British law in instituting a lawsuit in the
United States and the lawsuit defeated the tender offer.' 75
B. The Third Restatement
The claims of comity in defeating subject matter jurisdiction in a
securities law case were given some consideration in the Third
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third Restatement). 76 In
general, the Third Restatement set forth limits on the exercise of
jurisdiction premised on a balancing test, labeled "reasonableness,"
derived from antitrust cases. 177 This test places great weight on comity
174. See ConsolidatedCold ReLds, 871 F.2d at 263.

175. SeeJeremy G. Epstein, Takeover Panel Regains Control in B.A.T Ruling, N.Y.IU., Dec. 4, 1989, at
41. The City Code enjoins target companies from taking action to frustrate a bid. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES (1987).
177. Id. § 403. Section 403 of the Restatement provides:
Limitations on jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Even when one of the bases forjuisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory ofthe regulating state, ie., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation isdesigned to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(0 the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood ofconflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction
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and the need to accommodate interests of foreign states. Although
under the balancing test the conduct and effects tests can be considered,
other relevant factors could have reversed the outcome of the case.
These other factors include: justified expectations of the parties, the
extent to which U.S. regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system, the extent to which another state may have an
interest in regulating the activity, and the likelihood of conflict with
regulation by other states.'
The SEC strongly objected to the balancing test and urged that
relevant provisions of the Federal Securities Code be used as a
straightforward restatement of current law and practice.179 The Federal
Securities Code provided for securities law coverage of purchases, sales,
offers, proxy solicitations, tender offers, and investment advisory activity
occurring within the United States, although initiated outside the United
States, or initiated within the United States for consummation abroad.
Further, the Code provided for greater coverage for the antifraud
provisions than for regulatory provisions. 8 ' In order to accommodate
the SEC, the American Law Institute authored a special provision of the
Third Restatement to deal with securities law cases.' 8 ' This provision

over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state
has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising
jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the
other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
178. See id. § 403(2)(d), (O-(h).
179. See REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
INTERNATIONAIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, VII-21 to VII-23 (July 27, 1987); seealso Daniel
L Goelzer et al., The Drafi Revised Restatement: A Crtiquefomn a Securities Regulation Perspective, 19 INT'L LAW.

431,472-75 (1985).
180. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrruE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1905 (1980).
181.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 416.

Section 416 provides:
Jurisdiction to Regulate Activities Related to Securities
(1) The United States may generally exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to
(a)(i) any transaction in securities carried out in the United States to which a
national or resident of the United States is a party, or
(ii) any offer to enter into a securities transaction, made in the United States
by or to a national or resident of the United States;
(b) any transaction in securities
(i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, on an organized securities
. market in the United States, or
(i) carried out, or intended to be carried out, predominantly in the United
States, although not on an organized securities market;
(c) conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related to a transaction
described in Subsection (1)(b), if the conduct has, or is intended to have, a
substantial effect in the United States;
(d) conduct occurring predominantly in the United States that is related to a
transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the
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permits a court to assume jurisdiction based on conduct or effects.
Further, the rationale for an extraterritorial application of the law can
be either to protect U.S. markets or investors, activity in the United
States, or participation in the activity by a U.S. national or resident.
C. The Tender Offer Arena
The filing and disclosure requirements of the Williams Act generally
apply to the securities of issuers which are subject to the continuous
disclosure obligations of the Exchange Act. If a foreign issuer has
applied for an exemption from the Exchange Act registration provisions,
the filing and disclosure provisions generally do not apply.'82 If the
tender offer is not a cash offer but an exchange offer, the registration
provisions of the Securities Act may apply.'83 Moreover, the antifraud
provisions of the Williams Act apply to all tender offers, whether or not
the issuer is a reporting company. 8 4 Further, the SEC has taken the
position that the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act are
extraterritorial in scope. 85
As a result of this policy position, foreign offerors routinely exclude
U.S. investors from their takeover bids if this will enable them to avoid
compliance with the filing and disclosure requirements of the Williams

United States; or
(e) investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents with respect to
securities, carried out predominantly in the United States.
(2) Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to
transactions or conduct other than those addressed in Subsection (1)depends on whether
such exercise ofjurisdiction is reasonable in the light of§ 403, in particular
(a) whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be expected to
have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for
securities of the same issuer or on holdings in such securities by United States
nationals or residents;
(b) whether representations are made or negotiations are conducted in the
United States;
(c) whether the party sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of the United
States is a United States national or resident, or the persons sought to be
protected are United States nationals or residents.
182. See GolmitihNo Requiredio Comply with US. &wit Laws inBA.T Takeover, 21 SEC. REG.& L
REPT. (BNA) 1389, 1399 (1989).
183. See Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Securities Act Release No. 33-7190, 60 Fed. Reg.
35,663 (1995); Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (1990).
A discussion of the Securities registration provisions applicable to foreign issuers isbeyond the scope of this
article.
184. See Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers, Securities Act Release No.
33-6866 n.2, 55 Fed. Reg. 23751 (1990) [hereinafter Concept Release].
185. &eid
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Act and possibly the other provisions of the Exchange Act as well. 8 6
Despite Gold Fields, the courts have permitted foreign bidders for foreign
targets to escape from the Williams Act even if the target has U.S.
shareholders where they are excluded from the offer. In John LabattLtd.
"' the court held that where "a tender offer is totally
v. Onex Corp., LBT,87
foreign and neither solicits nor will accept tenders by U.S. shareholders,
it is not a tender offer directed to U.S. shareholders and the threshold
jurisdictional requirement of Section 14(e) [of the Exchange Act] is not
met."'88 It should be noted that Australian investors are similarly
excluded from foreign tender offers.8 9
Where foreign bidders are unable to escape from provisions of the
Williams Act that conflict with provisions of other regulatory schemes
such as the U. K. City Code, the SEC has been willing to grant
exemptions from the Williams Act under certain circumstances for
certain types of problems. 90 In addition, in 1991, the SEC proposed
exemptive rules and registration procedures, based on a mutual
recognition philosophy, to facilitate the inclusion of U.S. investors in
offers for a foreign target's securities. 9 ' Such exemptions would not
turn on the nationality of the bidder.'92 The Release proposed that if
U.S. security holders owned less than ten percent of the class of
securities subject to the offer, the bid would be exempted from the filing
and dissemination requirements, and the rules regarding proration,
minimum offer period, and withdrawal rights would be suspended so
long as there was an English language translation of any tender offer
materials 3and U.S. investors were treated at least as favorably as foreign
holders.'1

When the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) was adopted
with Canada, mutual recognition of tender offers was included.'
Pursuant to the MJDS, third-party and issuer tender offers to all holders
of any class of securities of a Canadian issuer of which U.S. shareholders
are less than forty percent of the class may proceed in accordance with
all relevant Canadian federal, provincial, and territorial rules and
186. &e Greene et al., supra note 33, at 825-27, 833-34.
187. 890 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
188. Id.at 245.
189. SeeGreene et al., supra note 33, at 825-26.
190. See Concept Release, supra note 184, at 23,753; sep, eg., PacifiCorp Offer for The Energy Group
PLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 724 (June 25, 1997).
191. See International Tender and Exchange Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29275, 56 Fed.
Reg. 27,582 (1991).
192. See i at 27,585.
193. &e id
194. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification to the Current Registration and Reporting
System for Canadian Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29354, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (1991).
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regulations instead of complying with the Williams Act.'95 However,
securities laws antifraud provisions continue to apply.'96
The intervening years have created further conflicts between the
United States and otherjurisdictions, as tender offers have become more
widespread and additional countries have developed tender offer
regulations. In 1991, the SEC detailed the conflicts between the U.K.
City Code and the Williams Act and proposed exemptive provisions and
a "mutual recognition of documents" regime to accommodate
bidders.9 7 Yet, the SEC has taken no further action to implement any
exemptions from the Williams Act for foreign issuers or any regime of
mutual recognition beyond the MJDS despite the disadvantage this
works for U.S. investors.
D. Insider Trading
The SEC has been very aggressive in giving the Exchange Act
extraterritorial reach in insider trading cases. As stated above, the SEC
has taken the position that the tender offer provisions, and particularly
the antifraud rules, of the Williams Act are extraterritorial in scope. In
insider trading cases, the SEC has utilized the injunctive process to exert
leverage on foreign financial institutions through fines and asset seizures
to force them to give up the names of suspected insider traders.'9 8
In one case, Fred C. Lee, a Taiwanese businessman, accumulated
nineteen million dollars in profits from trading on inside information
provided by a former analyst for Morgan Stanley & Company. Some
of the profits were deposited in a Hong Kong branch of Standard
Chartered, which also had branches in the United States. The district
court ordered disgorgement and a penalty and froze the assets. 99 Lee
then requested a court in Hong Kong to rule that this order had no
effect. The SEC responded by requesting sequestration from the Hong
Kong branch, which was granted. Standard Chartered then appealed
to the Second Circuit, arguing that the order violated its due process
rights and infringed upon Hong Kong's sovereignty. The Second
Circuit never had the opportunity to decide the matter, however,

195. &e id. at 30,047.
196. ee id. at 30,072.
197. Id. at 30,069-82.
198. See e.g.,Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Unifund SAI, 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990); Securities
and Exch. Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
199. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Wang, 699 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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because the Morgan Stanley analyst pled guilty in a criminal case and
Lee settled an SEC injunctive action for $25.1 million. 00
The SEC's aggressive posture in insider trading cases has been
criticized as infringing upon the jurisdiction of other countries.20 ' Yet,
the SEC has largely been successful not only in its insider trading
investigations (by breaking through foreign bank secrecy laws in many
high profile cases and negotiating memoranda of understanding with
various foreign regulators and the EU for the exchange of information
in enforcement cases), but also in persuading other countries that insider
trading should be banned. To at least some extent, it is because of SEC
pressure and pressure from U.S. institutional investors that various
jurisdictions, such as Germany, which previously ignored insider
trading, decided to outlaw it. Given this success in imposing a U.S.
standard on other countries, it is unlikely that the SEC will back off from
its claims of extraterritoriality.
E. A ComparativeAnalysis
The other jurisdictions analyzed in this Article have different
approaches to the problem of extraterritorial coverage of their insider
trading laws. Because tender offer regulation in the United Kingdom
and Germany and to some extent in Australia, is self-regulatory, the
analysis here of extraterritorial coverage will be limited to insider
trading law. In this connection, it is important to remember that in the
United Kingdom insider trading is a criminal violation and civil damage
actions are unavailable. In Australia, and perhaps in Germany, insider
trading is both a criminal and civil offense.
In the United Kingdom, individuals are not guilty of the offense of
dealing on insider information unless either: they were within the
United Kingdom at the time they were alleged to have done any act
constituting or forming part of the alleged dealing; or the dealing was
alleged to have occurred on a U.K. regulated market. Further,
individuals are not guilty of encouraging or disclosing insider
information unless they were either within the United Kingdom when
they were alleged to have disclosed the information or encouraged the

200. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Wang, 44 S.E.C. 377; Litigation Release No. 12191, SEC
Docket (Aug. 2, 1989).
201. See, e.g., Lawrence Collins, Froblens of Enforcemen in the MultinationalSewitia Market A United
Kigdom Perspective, 9 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L 487, 505-506 (1987); Arthur R. Pinto, The Intenationalization
ofthe Hostie TakeovrMw
Its ImpVcathiofor Choie ofLaw on Corporateand Secuities Law, 16 BROOK.J. INT'L
L. 55, 60 (1990).
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dealing, or the recipient of the information was within the United
Kingdom when the information or encouragement was transmitted." 2
In Germany, the territorial scope of the criminal sanctions is
governed by the Penal Guide.2" 3 Criminal sanctions for insider trading
apply to: (1) violations committed within Germany; (2) violations
committed abroad against a German victim, provided that the act
constitutes a criminal offence at the place where committed; and (3)
violations committed in a foreign country if the act constitutes a criminal
offense in that country, if committed by a German citizen or by a
foreigner who is found in Germany and not extradited.2 4
The insider trading laws of Australia apply to "[a]cts within Australia
in relation to securities of any body corporate, whether formed or
carrying on business in Australia or not," and to "[a] cts outside Australia
in relation to securities 205
of a body corporate that is formed or carries on
Australia.,
in
business
As can be seen, the individual defendant in Itoba described above,20 6
who resided in Connecticut but on the basis of inside information sold
stock over the London Stock Exchange, violated the criminal insider
trading provisions of U.K. law as well as the antifraud provisions of the
U.S. securities laws. If such sale had been to a German victim, German
insider trading laws could also have been violated, even if the sale had
been in London. Under Australian law, however, the acts would either
have had to have been done in Australia, or the securities involved
would have had to have been issued by an Australian corporation.
As an increasing number of jurisdictions pass and enforce insider
trading laws, multiple criminal prosecutions become possible.
Cooperation among securities regulators will hopefully eliminate
duplicate prosecutions. Further conflict can be envisioned, however, if
a greater number of jurisdictions enact civil liability provisions for
insider trading.
One of the interesting questions such a situation would present is
whether U.S. courts might then dismiss cases on the type of grounds set
forth in the Third Restatement.0 7 In recent cases involving actions by
Names in Lloyd's of London insurance syndicates, dismissal turned to
some extent on the issue of whether plaintiffs in securities class actions
who had agreed to have U.K. law apply to their contracts would have
202.
(Eng.).
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

SeeCriminalJustice Act, 1993, § 62 (4th ed. Halsbury's Statutes of England and Wales 1991)
SeeHickinbotham & Vaupel, supra note 153, at 140.
Seeid. at 140-41.
McDonald, supra note 120, at 450.
See
supra text accompanying note 170.
Seesupra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
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recourse in the United Kingdom. "° If insider trading violations do not
give rise to civil penalties, it is difficult to argue there are equivalent
actions abroad. But if civil penalties are available, a defendant could
attempt to dismiss a case, on appropriate facts, on the grounds that a
plaintiff should bring suit in another country.
V. MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING REGULATORY CONFLJCTS

A. Academic Theories
Actual and potential conflicts between U.S. law and the laws of other
jurisdictions have sparked a wide range of academic theories concerning
methods for resolving such conflicts. Professor Merritt B. Fox has
suggested that the SEC limit its jurisdiction to U.S. issuers and allow
foreign regulators to control foreign issuers.20 9 According to Professor
Fox, the costs and benefits of disclosure are borne by issuers, and
financial economics does not justify the customary rationales for forcing
issuers to disclose more information-fairer markets, lessening
investment risk, or efficient allocation of resources.210 Professor Fox
therefore argues that the traditional SEC goal of investor protection and
its more recently articulated goal of market protection are both
misguided and U.S. practice should change so that the SEC imposes its
disclosure regime only on U.S. issuers regardless of where transactions
in the issuer's shares occur or the nationality of buyers.21' This
argument is made for securities offerings but presumably would extend
to the Williams Act because Professor Fox has also argued that, even in
insider trading cases, the only relevant jurisdictional hook should be the
issuer's nationality.2 12

ProfessorJill E. Fisch has argued that the SEC's extraterritorial reach
with respect to tender offers is an affront to the sovereignty of other
nations and Congress should amend the Williams Act to restrict it to
U.S. issuers."' Professor Fisch would define "U.S. issuers" fairly
broadly, however, and include not only securities issued by a U.S.
208.
, 4g., Richards v. Lloyd's of Iondon, [current] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 90, 134 (February
3, 1998) (en banc); Bonny v. Society of Lloyds, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyds,
996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993).
209. See Merritt B. Fox, Se%uilisclaure in a GlobatingMwrL"Who ShOuld Rtulate Whom), 95 MICH.
L REV. 2498 (1997).
210. Seeid. at 2532-50.
211. Se id. at 2608-09.
212. See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading in a GlobalicingMarket Who Should Regulate What' 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 263.
213. See Fisch, supra note 3, at 525.
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corporation, but also securities listed on a national securities exchange
and securities registered with the SEC pursuant to § 12(g) of the
Exchange Act. 214 Her proposal, therefore, is not as radical as that of
Professor Fox, but would only limit jurisdiction in antifraud cases to the
jurisdiction the SEC now exercises with respect to the filing and
disclosure requirements of the Williams Act.
Edward F. Greene and other practitioners have urged the SEC to
move to a regime of mutual recognition.215 Under a mutual recognition
regime, disclosure documents prepared in accordance with an issuer's
home jurisdiction are accepted without change by securities regulators
in other jurisdictions. As I have previously argued, however, mutual
recognition is only feasible politically if it is based on a fair degree of
harmonization. 216 Along these lines, Professor Steven R. Salbu has
advocated harmonization through statutes.217 ProfessorJames D. Cox
has taken issue with the proposition that harmonization is a desirable
goal, and advocates inter-market regulatory competition. 218 He argues
that there are benefits to such competition not only in the area of
disclosure policy, but also where abuse of managerial opportunism is
involved, such as insider trading.219 While Professor Cox recognizes the
value of SEC accommodation to foreign laws, he also recognizes the
practical and philosophical limits of such accommodation. 220 He
therefore urges the SEC to engage in deregulation so that U.S.
disclosure standards will be competitive internationally.22'
In my view, while each of the foregoing theories is logically argued,
the problem with all of them is that the U.S. policy setter, the SEC,
perceives its mandate as investor protection and protection of U.S.
securities markets. Further, the SEC has successfully persuaded the
courts that it has jurisdiction to police foreign issuers that tap the U.S.
capital markets and foreign transactions that are planned or executed in
part in the United States. The SEC has been happy to participate in

214. Id.
215. See gemray Greene et al., supra note 33; see also Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony orDeferenc
U.S. DisclosureRMui
in the In
inal CapitaL/Ma*e, 50 BUS. LAW. 413 (1995); Pinto, supra note 201
at 76.
216. Sm Robcrta S. Karmel, Discussion Paper, Natinal Treabent, Harmonizationand MutualRecognition:
International Bar Association, Capital Markets Forum (1993) (on file with the Uniwrsiy of Cinnati Lau
Review).
217. See Steven R. Salbu, Regulaion of Insider Trading in a GlobalMa*ece: A Uniform Statutoy Approach
66 TUL L REv. 837, 838 (1992).
218. SeeJames D. Cox, Rethinking US. Securities Laws in the Shadow of InternationalRegulatoy Competition
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 157, 158-64.
219. Seeid. at 165-69.
220. See id. at 177-82.
221. See id. at 185.
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harmonization projects -thatit believes will not lower U.S. standards, but
rather raise international standards to U.S. levels.222 Also, the SEC has
put considerable resources into cooperation agreements with foreign
regulators3 providing for assistance in the prosecution of insider
22
traders.
Despite ongoing globalization of the markets and the challenges of
Internet communications and trading, it is unlikely that the SEC will
accede to the pleas of those who advocate reduced regulatory
jurisdiction or mutual recognition in situations where U.S. investors
have a stake or U.S. securities markets will be adversely affected. On
the other hand, where relaxed jurisdiction might be in the interests of
U.S. investors or markets, the SEC is more likely to be sympathetic. It
is probable, therefore, that the SEC will eventually exempt tender offers
for foreign securities that have a minority U.S. ownership component
from the Williams Act so that U.S. investors can be cashed out. But
even in this area, exemption from the antifraud provisions is highly
unlikely.
A regime in which U.S. law applies to tender offers for the securities
of target companies that have a significant trading market in the United
States is not as wrong headed as commentators have suggested. When
a foreign issuer enters the U.S. disclosure system voluntarily in order to
list on a U.S. stock exchange or raise capital, it becomes subject to the
Williams Act and investors expect to be protected by the U.S. securities
laws. With regard to disclosure requirements imposed on a bidder or
the obligation to refrain from trading on the basis of inside information,
there is no insurmountable problem posed by requiring compliance with
U.S. law. On the other hand, where disclosure regimes are comparable
for tender offer documents, the mutual recognition solution adopted
with respect to Canada is a viable solution and is preferable to requiring
a bidder to comply with multiple disclosure requirements. Tender offer
disclosure requirements in the United States and the United Kingdom,
for example, are reasonably similar so mutual recognition could simplify
U.S.-U.K. takeovers.224
The imposition of U.S. law becomes more problematic when
conflicting mechanical requirements for the conduct of a tender offer
makes it impossible for a bidder to comply with two or more regimes.

222. See BrianJ. Lane, The Cunnt Regulaty Perspecti on IntmationalOfferis--Recent Developmens and
ContemplatedInikam, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1, 21-22 (Belier & Mann eds., 1997).
223. There isan excellent summary of transnational enforement efforts in insider trading cases and
the Memoranda of Understanding negotiated by the SEC to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
such cases in WILLIAM K.S. WANG AND MARC. I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING §§ 14.4 (1996).
224. Sev Greene et al., supra note 33, at 852-53.
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In such a situation, it would seem reasonable and fair to apply the law
of the target's country. Giving deference to the law of the bidder's
country would not be good policy because a bidder could organize a
corporation as the acquirer in a friendly jurisdiction. When U.S.
investors buy a foreign issuer's securities, they are buying into a foreign
corporate governance system. Also, the availability of takeover defenses
is generally regarded as a question of internal corporate affairs and
deference should be given to the target's home country with respect to
such issues.
B. The Thirteenth Directive
The Treaty of Rome mandated at least some harmonization of the
company laws of the Member States of the EU in order to achieve the
objective of freedom of establishment of companies throughout the
EU.225 In the 1985 White Paper, the Commission for the EU
emphasized the need for facilitating cross-border cooperation as a
means of achieving a single European market.226 Initially, the draft of
the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law was concerned with the
equal treatment of the various parties involved in takeovers and the
transparency of corporate takeovers while a takeover bid was in
progress.227 There was a provision for a mandatory bid once a threshold
position of one-third of the voting shares were acquired. Also,
controlling target-company shareholders would have been required to
act in the interests of all shareholders by not frustrating the bid.
At that time, and even today, takeover bids in Europe were not as
common as in the United States, except for the United Kingdom.
Further, the system of takeover regulation varied considerably.228 In
some countries, such as the United Kingdom, capital formation
depended upon equity capital so there was a constant monitoring of
management performance, protection of minority shareholders, and
efficient resource allocation. On the continent, as exemplified by
Germany, management was given a long-term mandate, its first duty
was to the business, and then to the employees and the company's
bankers. Further, there was stable and knowledgeable ownership of

225. S&eTREATY ESTABISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 54(3)(g).
226. Seesupra text accompanying note 78.
227. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other
General Bids, 1989 OJ. (C64) 8.
228. SeeIngrid Depser, AmndadEC Pposalfor a 13th CoundlDirective on Company Law Concenig Takover
and other GeneralBids, INT'L Bus. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 483, 484.
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business with close ties to banks.229 Given this difference, the British
regarded takeovers as the ultimate discipline over bad management,
whereas the Germans considered hostile bids as inimical to three
ingredients of their post-war success-management's ability to take the
long-term view, harmonious labor relations, and the disciplinary
function of German banks. Accordingly, German law countenanced
numerous barriers to hostile takeovers."' Because the Germans and
other continentals believed that the Thirteenth Directive adopted the
pro-takeover underpinnings of the U.K. system, they opposed it. The
British also opposed it because they did not wish to see their selfregulatory system replaced by a statutory system.
However, the European Commission believed that there was a need
to facilitate the restructuring of European companies to meet
international competition, so an amended version of the Thirteenth
Directive was put forth.23 ' By this time, takeover activity had increased
to some extent and the need for shareholder protection had become
more apparent.2 The amended Thirteenth Directive required each
Member State to designate a supervisory authority to put the Directive
into effect, a requirement that previously had been included in the EU
Insider Trading Directive. The supervisory authorities were then given
the mandate to assure, among other things, that holders of securities in
the target company would be treated equally; target company
shareholders would have time and information to reach an informed
decision on the bid and the target company board would not frustrate
the bid.2 3 Mandatory bid provisions and mandated disclosure in
offering documents also were specified. However, there was provision
for mutual recognition.23
The amended Thirteenth Directive fared no better in achieving
acceptance and a consensus in favor of adopting it than the original
proposed directive. In 1997 a new and streamlined proposal for a
takeover directive was put forward by the European Commission.235
This proposal takes into account the subsidiarity principle and leaves
Member States some latitude in deciding how to achieve the goals of the

229. See id.
230. Se id.
231. 89/C 240/09, Sept. 14, 1990.
232. See Lois Moore, 77e EC's Proposed TakeoverDirecf.s, N.Y.Lj., May 28, 1991, at 1. Takeover
activity has continued to increase. &eMergerMonday, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 1997, at 61.
233. See Amended Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law
Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, art. 6(a), 1989 OJ. (L395) 2, 6.
234. See id. art. 6(3).
235. &e 97/C 378/11, Dec. 13, 1997.
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directive. The Directive would apply to securities traded on a regulated
market of a company governed by the law of an EU Member State.
Nevertheless, the general principles of the Thirteenth Directive that
would have to be followed in national law are unchanged. They are
that holders of securities in target companies who are in the same
position must be treated equally, the addressees of a bid must have
sufficient time and information to enable them to reach a properly
informed decision, the board of an offeree company must act in the
interests of the company as a whole, false markets must not be created
in the securities of companies involved in a bid, and target companies
must not be hindered in the conduct of their business beyond a
reasonable time. Further, national rules would have to be established
for a decision to bid to be made public once the supervisory authority
and target company are notified and the bidder would be required to
draft a disclosure document and submit it to the supervisory authority.
The Directive recognizes that prompt announcement of an intention to
launch a takeover bid reduces opportunities for insider trading. The
target company board would be prohibited from taking action to affect
the success of the bid after receiving notification of the bid and they
would have to publish a report giving reasoned views on the bid. Rules
would have to be published on withdrawal or nullity of bids, revision of
bids, treatment of competing bids, and disclosure of the outcome.
Whether mandatory bids would be required at any point would be left
to the laws of the Member States.
The twice amended Directive remains an anathema to the British
who fear that, despite the recognition of the Takeover Panel as a proper
supervisory authority, it would change the workings of the Panel by
tangling its operations in endless legal challenges.236 The prospects for
adoption of the Directive are therefore murky.
C. Harmonization ofInsider TradingBans
As I have argued elsewhere at length, prohibitions against trading on
inside information should be viewed as ancillary to the primary
securities law goal of disclosure and such bans are necessary to enforce
disclosure obligations.237 In the case of laws and regulations to suppress
information about forthcoming tender offers, the prohibition against
trading on undisclosed information accomplishes two objectives. It

236. SeeEuro-takovers, FIN. TIMES,Jan. 14, 1997, at 17.
237. See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Infonnation-A Breach In Search of a DuV, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
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assures that shareholders of target companies will enjoy the protections
of the Williams Act (or a comparable regulatory regime in other
countries) and it fosters the objective of takeovers as a shareholder tool
in disciplining management by protecting the bidder. If trading on
information about a forthcoming bid is permitted by anyone other than
the bidder, the price of the target company's securities will increase and
the bidder will have to make an offer at a higher price.238
It would seem logical, therefore, that adoption and enforcement of
insider trading bans in tender offer situations would follow from
legislation like the Williams Act protecting shareholders of a target
company. Further, harmonization of insider trading laws would seem
to follow from harmonization of laws on public company disclosure and
the conduct of tender offers. In fact, however, the contrary has been
true. It has been easier for countries to agree on harmonized prohibitions against trading on inside information than on the harmonization
of disclosure standards and tender offer legislation. As described above,
the European Union was able to adopt a directive outlawing insider
trading but has not yet been able to adopt a directive regulating takeovers. Further, the SEC has been able to negotiate memoranda of
understanding with numerous jurisdictions in an effort to combat insider
trading worldwide. In addition, the Council of Europe in 1990 adopted
a Convention on Insider Trading, condemning it and committing
signatories to a regime of mutual assistance in combating it. 9'
Is there any explanation for the consensus on insider trading in light
of the impasse on takeover legislation? One commentator has suggested
that there are three principal factors which have motivated countries to
crack down on insider trading-competition between markets to attract
foreign investors, international enforcement efforts spearheaded by the
SEC, and advances in technology facilitating regulatory surveillance. 2"
The facts of insider trading cases are scandalous and hard to defend.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia all strengthened
their insider trading prohibitions in recent years in the wake of insider
trading scandals and the perception that existing law enforcement
mechanisms were not successful.24 ' The justification for insider trading

238. Probably in recognition of this rarely articulated premise behind Rule 14c-3, the Supreme Court
in O'Hagon reserved judgment on whether "warehousing," that is,purchasing of target company stock by
confederates of the bidder, isinsider trading. 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2217 n.17 (1997).
239. 29 I.L.M. 309 (1990).
240. See Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Wout Fronirs: Trends in the Intemationa!Response
to Insider Tradin. lAW & CoNTEMp. PROBS., AUTUMN 1992, at 199,201-07.
241. See Larry R. Lavoie, The Insider Trading and Securities FraudEnforcement Act of 1988, 22 SEC. &
COMMODITIES REc. (Standard & Poor's) 1, 1 (Jan. 11, 1989); White, supra note 149, at 164; TOMASIC
ET AL., supra note 118, § 12.25, at 845-46.
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laws generally has been rather vague language concerning the integrity
of the securities markets and investor protection.242 Although the
German banking industry was strongly opposed to insider trading
legislation, it was backed into a comer by scandals involving Deutsche
Bank and then a member of the supervisory board of Daimler Benz.243
It is interesting that in Germany, insider trading laws have been used as
a lever to compel better corporate disclosure. A publication by the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange points out that the legal elements of insider
information are broader than those of information that is subject to a
disclosure obligation, but the timely publication of price-sensitive
information helps to prevent the abuse of inside information.2
Regulation that fosters takeovers, however, impinges upon powerful
business interests-a country's corporate leaders. Public choice theory
would suggest that there would need to be countervailing powerful
interests for the interests of shareholders to supplant the interests of
corporate managements. 14 In the case of takeovers, investment
bankers, their advisors, and institutional investors benefit from
regulations that threaten corporate managers. Therefore it is not
surprising that the SEC, whose primary constituents are on Wall Street,
rather than on Main Street, favors tender offers as a corporite
governance mechanism, whereas German regulators, whose constituents
are universal banks, do not favor takeovers as a check on corporate
managers. 2" As long as countries have different systems of corporate
finance it is unlikely that they will be able to harmonize takeover laws.
Further, even if insider trading on confidential information about
upcoming tender offers is banned as a result of a general ban against
trading on inside information, it is unlikely that enforcement of such a
ban will be as vigorous in countries that do not foster a market for
corporate control as in countries that do.

242. See O'Hagan, 117 S. CL at 2210 (1997); White, supra note 149, at 163; Justin Mannolini, Insider
Trading-TheNeedfor ConceptualC/ariv, 14 COMPANY & SEC. LJ. 151, 155 (1996).
243. See Lcacock, supra note 108, at 63-64.
244. See INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS AND AD Hoc DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO THE GERMAN
SECURIlES TRADING ACT, supra note 107, at 9, 13. "
245. Public choice theory suggests that regulations will tend to favor (subsidize) relatively small and
well-organized groups that have a high per capita stake in the regulations, at the expense of relatively large
poorly organized groups with a lower per capita stake in the program. In the case of the SEC,
approximately 10,000 corporations prepare disclosure documents that support financial analysts, portfolio
managers, and other securities market professionals. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS &J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE
SEC AND THE PuBLIc INTEREST 21-23 (1981).
246. Similarly, state laws in the United States are sympathetic to corporate managers who wish to
resist hostile takeovers. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
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VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has generally outlined takeover regulation and
prohibitions against trading on inside information concerning tender
offers in four countries that have different legal systems and different
systems of corporate finance. Competition for capital in a globalizing
economy is exerting a harmonizing influence on the laws pertaining to
takeovers, but such harmonization is far from complete. Insider trading
laws are more compatible than laws regulating the conduct of takeovers
and the disclosure of information by bidders.
In the absence of harmonization, the SEC can be expected to
continue to vigorously enforce its insider trading prohibitions, even if
this involves the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Because insider
trading is essentially tortious conduct, at this juncture of the
development of international securities regulation, it is reasonable to
apply traditional comity and choice of law concepts that cover torts
generally. Policy regulating takeovers is a more complex matter. Even
where the target company is foreign and is listed on a U.S. exchange or
NASDAQ U.S. investors and markets are not necessarily aided by the
imposition of the Williams Act on bids because U.S. investors are
deprived of the ability to tender shares. This is also the case in
Australia. Regulators might therefore be advised to rely upon mutual
recognition in such situations, at least where the percentage of domestic
investors is relatively minor. Furthermore, because takeover regulation
involves corporate governance at least as much as investor protection,
according comity to the law of the target issuer's country of
incorporation with regard to takeover defenses is sound policy.

